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EXPUNGEMENT OF ARREST RECORDS:
THE NEED FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION
This note considers the need for federal legislation which would require
governmental law enforcement agencies to expunge the criminal records' of
persons who are arrested but not ultimately convicted. 2 The Supreme Court
of the United States has never addressed the issue of expungement of criminal
records. The federal and state courts have been inconsistent in handling cases
on the subject and both have called upon Congress or the legislatures to
resolve the issue.3 Congress has never answered the call and until recently
most state legislatures have failed to pass legislation.
The results of this governmental inactivity have become apparent in the
chilling effect of an arrest record on employment opportunities. There has
been an average of approximately 6 million adult arrests each year in the
past three years. Approximately 40% of these resulted in no conviction. 4 This
burden falls especially hard on minorities, who, because of socio-economic
factors, are most likely to have an arrest record. At a time when government
is declaring all out war on minority discrimination, the maintenance and
dissemination of records of arrests which do not result in conviction perpetuate
discrimination in employment, law enforcement, and licensing.
This note takes the position that the only method of countering these
harmful effects is to return to the fundamental principle of American justice;
i.e., the presumption of innocence. "The principle that there is a presumption
of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and
elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration
of our criminal law."' 5 Expungement provides concrete substance for the
presumption of innocence and ensures that the moral force of the criminal
law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether
innocent men are guilty. Therefore, federal legislation is needed to provide
uniformity in state expungement statutes, to close loopholes in existing legislation,
and to fill the void left in those states still lacking such legislation. Analysis
of this legislation requires a sensitive balancing of the needs of governmental
law enforcement agencies with the individual's constitutional rights, employment
1. The terms "criminal record" and "arrest record" are used interchangeably because an arrest not
resulting in conviction and an arrest resulting in conviction are both listed on the same master "rap
sheet" in the computerized criminal history data banks of the federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies. When inquiries are made regarding a subject's "criminal record" the computerized printout
response reflects all arrests regardless of the eventual disposition or lack of disposition information.
2. The scope of this note is limited to adult arrest records and does not attend to the shortcomings of
current juvenile expungement statutes.
3. See United' States v. Singleton, 442 F. Supp. 722, 724 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
4. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States, 1977, Uniform Crime Reports (1978).
Annual arrest figures, however, do not measure the actual number of individuals arrested since one
person may be arrested several times during the year for the same or different offenses. Further
statistics show that 40% of the male population will acquire a non-traffic arrest at some point in their
lives, with the percentage for Black urban males soaring to 90%. President's Committee on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice Report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 237(1967).
5. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). See also Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978);
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) on the subject of the
presumption of innocence.
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opportunities and reputation. To that end, the present uses of these arrest
records will be scrutinized together with their economic, social and legal effects
on the exonerated arrestee. This analysis will then be the basis for suggesting
key elements to be included in future expungement legislation.
BACKGROUND: THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL ARREST RECORD SYSTEMS
Criminal records, which include arrest records not resulting in conviction,
are collected in all 50 states, in most cities, and by the federal government.
They are usually stored and maintained in computer systems at each respective
level.6 At the federal level, the U.S. Attorney General is authorized to "acquire,
collect, classify and preserve identification, criminal identification, crime and
other records: and exchange these records with, and for the official use of
authorized officials of the federal government, the states, cities. and penal and
other institutions."'7 (emphasis added). An implementing regulation delegates
this authority to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(F.B.I.).8
Currently the F.B.I. has "criminal" records on approximately 23 million
individuals. 9 An average of 13,000 fingerprint cards of persons arrested come
in daily to the Bureau. The Bureau's Identification Division (Ident) is the
central repository of arrest records for all federal, state and local law enforcement
agencies. In addition, Ident contains non-criminal fingerprint records of persons
seeking employment or licensing in the various state and federal positions
requiring fingerprint checks. 10 There are approximately 15,000 authorized
non-law enforcement recipients of F.B.I arrest records.
The director of the Bureau sets the policies controlling Ident subject to
review by the Attorney General. 11 In its relationship with the states, the Bureau
considers the records of the contributing state or local agency to be the property
of that agency. 12 In contracting with these contributing agencies, the Bureau
disclaims responsibility for misinformation, lack of dispositions and unlawful
dissemination. 13 The arresting agency exercises discretion as to which arrest
records are sent to Ident, so long as they fall within the general standards
set by the Bureau. For example, the Bureau considers disorderly conduct,
vagrancy, loitering, traffic offenses (other than driving while intoxicated) and
juvenile offenses as non-serious and therefore unacceptable.' 4 In areas not
addressed by the Bureau's regulations, the states are afforded discretion to
6. The fingerprint cards and photographs ("mug shots") are kept in manual files, while a notation of
the arrest indicating the contributor of the fingerprints (arresting police), the arrestee's name, date of
arrest, the charge, and disposition are placed on a computerized master "rap sheet". This system is
followed in nearly all states and most large cities.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 534(a) (1970).
8. 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(b) (1975).
9. The F.B.I. statistics hereafter, unless otherwise indicated, are the result of an interview with Special
Agent James W. Hoffman, Project Manager, Computerized Criminal History Program, at F.B.I.
Headquarters, Washington D.C. (October 1978).
10. For a brief summary of positions requiring F.B.I. criminal record checks see the appendix following
Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718, 728 (D.D.C. 1971). See also Exec. Order No. 10,450,
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1953), requiring an F.B.I. criminal record check on all prospective
federal employees.
11. 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (1975).
12. 28 C.F.R. § 20.31 (1976).
13. 28 C.F.R. § 20.31 (1976).
14. 28 C.F.R. § 20.32 (1975).
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determine the seriousness of the arrest. Some state and local agencies consider
prostitution, adultery and homosexuality serious offenses and these arrests are
maintained in Ident.
The F.B.I. also has a relatively new criminal records computer which is
separate from Ident. The Computerized Criminal History (C.C.H.) system was
created in 1971 to facilitate rapid exchange of criminal records among the
states. Overseeing the C.C.H. operation is the National Crime Information
Center Policy Board composed of 26 members of the criminal justice community.
Currently, the C.C.H. system has only twelve states participating.' 5 Low
participation can be attributed to the fact that C.C.H. is basically the same
service provided by Ident, although in some respects a faster and more efficient
system. Thus, most of the states use Ident to avoid incurring costs for essentially
the same service.
On the state and local level, each law enforcement agency has virtually
the same system as the F.B.I. for maintaining criminal records, with almost
every state having computers for storing this data. Since these systems are
funded wholly or in part by federal funds, certain rules governing access and
dissemination are required to be followed. 16
Since there is no federal expungement statute, the F.B.I. will expunge a
criminal record and return all accompanying identification data (fingerprints
and photographs) only if it is requested by the contributing (arresting) agency
or if it receives a court order requiring it to do so. The state and local police
also will expunge arrest records only if there is a statute requiring expungement
or if required to do so by court order.
Most state statutes have various conditions that must be met before
expungement of the exonerated arrestee's record is permitted. Some examples
are: no prior convictions, no prior arrests, no availability if exclusionary rule
applied. Also, most of the statutes provide for "sealing" the arrest record,
i.e., making it legally available to law enforcement only. In summary, some
state legislatures have just begun in the past few years to recognize the failure
of society to distinguish an arrest record from a conviction record and have
passed rudimentary expungement statutes. These statutes define "expungement"
in a variety of ways, including; annulment of a conviction, sealing, restricting
dissemination, and placing a notation of the disposition on the record. (A
survey of state expungement statutes can be found in the- appendix to this
note.)
JUDICIAL RESPONSE
The Supreme Court of the United States has never decided an expungement
case, and lower federal and state courts have been inconsistent in handling
the expungement issue. Case law in this area can be classified into four
categories:
15. As of January, 1979, the states participating in the C.C.H. program were: Arizona, California, Florida,
Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 3771(b) and (c) (1973); 28 C.F.R. § 20.25 (1976); 28 C.F.R. § 20.33(4)(b) (1976); 28
C.F.R. § 20.38 (1976); Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579 (1974).
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(1) Decisions holding that the problem should be resolved by Congress or
the legislature, and refusing to expunge without authorizing statute. 17
(2) Decisions in which the courts deny any judicial expungement power,
but restrain dissemination of arrest records. 18
(3) Decisions which allow expungement only in extreme circumstances, e.g.,
arrest involving gross police misconduct or without probable
cause.
19
(4) Decisions which permit expungement regardless of legislative inaction
or absence of special circumstances. 20
In the first category the leading cases were handed down by the California
courts in Sterling v. City of Oakland 21 and Loder v. Municipal Court. 22 In
Sterling, a woman was the victim of an erroneous citizen's arrest. After the
charges were dismissed and after a successful false arrest suit, Ms. Sterling
brought suit for expungement of her arrest record. The court of appeals
affirmed the lower court's decision to deny expungement, stating, "We base
our decision chiefly upon the omission of the Legislature of this state to
prescribe any duty to return photographs or fingerprints, . . . but we find
some support for the judgment in the decisions of other states. ' 23 While
legislative omission was the primary reason for the holding, three other grounds
were given as support for the decision:
a) That existing statutes were sufficient to protect an exonerated arrestee
by insuring that the eventual disposition of the case is made part of the
actual record and limiting access to such reports;
b) That the existence of an arrest record would not adversely affect the
arrestee; and
c) That any invasion of the arrestee's right of privacy caused by maintaining
such records was insignificant.
Fourteen yeafs after Sterling, the California Supreme Court re-examined
the expungement issue in Loder v. Municipal Court. 24 Though faced with new
constitutional challenges such as the right of privacy, the court denied
expungement on the same grounds as in Sterling. The court stated that the
right of privacy of an unconvicted arrestee under the California and United
States Constitutions is outweighed by a compelling state interest in the retention
and dissemination of arrest records in "the promotion of more efficient law
17. United States v. Singleton, 442 F. Supp. 722 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Hammons v. Scott, 423 F. Supp. 625
(N.D. Cal. 1976); Rowlett v. Fairfax, 446 F. Supp. 186 (W.D. Mo. 1978); Loder v. Municipal Court,
17 Cal, 3d 859, 553 P.2d 624 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1109 (1977); Herschel v. Dyra, 365
F.2d 17 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 973 (1966); Sterling v. City of Oakland, 208 Cal. App.
2d 1, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1962).
18. Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971); Utz v. Cullinane, 520 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Tarlton v. Saxbe, 407 F. Supp. 1083 (D.D.C. 1976).
19. United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967); Wilson v. Webster, 467 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir.
1972); Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Washington Mobilization Committee v.
Cullinane, 566 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1975);
Bromley v. Crisp, 561 F.2d 1251 (10th Cir. 1977); Coleman v. United States Dep't of Justice, 429
F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Ind. 1977); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
20. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d
211 (1971); United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.C.P.R. 1967).
21. 208 Cal. App. 2d 1, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1962).
22. 17 Cal. 3d 859, 553 P.2d 624 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1109 (1977).
23. 208 Cal. App. 2d at 4.
24. 17 Cal. 3d 859, 553 P.2d 624 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1109 (1977).
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enforcement and criminal justice; more specifically, the state's purpose is to
protect the public from recidivist offenders." 25 The court also felt that California
had adequate legislation protecting the privacy of exonerated arrestees from
adverse uses of their arrest records.
Finally, the court said that it was unlawful under California law to destroy
or remove an arrest record and that it was powerless to do so because such
power is vested only in the legislature. Ironically, the court also noted that
the California Department of Justice had implemented an expungement program
providing for destruction of these records (without any authority to do so from
the legislature).
The second category of cases which denies expungement power but restrains
dissemination, has been rendered a virtual nullity by recent decisions26 interpreting
the Supreme Court of the United States decision in Paul v. Davis 27, though
Paul dealt with neither expungement nor arrest records. In Paul, the
defendant, who had never been convicted of a crime, was arrested for shoplifting
and the charges were subsequently dismissed. In the meantime, the police
published a pamphlet to over 1000 stores containing Davis' name and photograph
along with others and labeled them as "active shoplifters." The Court held
that though Davis had a cause of action for defamation against the state, the
distribution of the pamphlet was not an infringement on Davis' constitutional
rights, and that reputation involved neither a liberty nor property interest
protected by due process of the fifth or fourteenth amendments. Likewise, any
claim of defamation in Paul could not be asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Finally, the Court also rejected a claim that distribution of the pamphlet
infringed the defendant's constitutional right of privacy. 28 The Court in Paul
did not address the issue of arrest records or expungement, but as noted above,
three lower court decisions have interpreted Paul to extend to arrest records.
The third category of cases,-allowing expungement only in extreme
circumstances, such as arrests involving gross police misconduct or arrests
without probable cause-represents the current position taken by most federal
courts. "The power of the courts to order expungement of an arrest record is
a narrow one, [which] should not be routinely used whenever a criminal
prosecution ends in acquittal, but should be reserved for the unusual or extreme
case." 29
The last category of cases permits expungement regardless of legislative
inaction or absence of special circumstances. The leading case in this area is
Menard v. Saxbe, 30 in which Dale Menard, a 19 year old student, was arrested
for suspicion of burglary in Los Angeles. The Los Angeles police sent copies
of his fingerprint cards and other arrest data to the California State Bureau
of Criminal Identification and to the F.B.I. After charges were withdrawn the
25. Id. at 628.
26. Rowlett v. Fairfax, 446 F. Supp. 186 (W.D. Mo. 1978); Hammons v. Scott, 423 F. Supp. 618 (N.D.
Cal. 1976); Loder v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal 3d 859, 553 P.2d 624 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1109 (1977).
27. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
28. Id. at 714.
29. United States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1975).
30. Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970), 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971); Menard v.
Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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Los Angeles Police Department notified these same agencies of Menard's
release. The disposition column of his newly-acquired permanent criminal record
with local, state, and federal agencies stated, "Unable to connect with any
felony or misdemeanor at this time."
Menard (with the aid of the American Civil Liberties Union) brought suit
to expunge the arrest record or to restrict its dissemination. The federal district
court ruled that because there was probable cause for Menard's arrest,31 it
could not order expungement of the arrest record. The court did, however,
enjoin dissemination of the F.B.I. criminal records to anyone but law enforcement
or government agencies. 32
Menard appealed the decision in an effort to obtain expungement. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that Menard's arrest had
been a "detention" and not an arrest, therefore, any record of the encounter
could not be included in F.B.I. criminal files, 33 and ordered expungement of
Menard's record.
In summarizing these four categories it is obvious that expungement has
not made progress through judicial determinations. Most of the holdings call
for legislative action to strike the delicate balance between law enforcement
needs for such data and the rights of the exonerated arrestee.
ADVERSE USES AND EFFECTS OF AN ARREST RECORD
Employment
The most prominent study of the deleterious effect of an arrest record on
a prospective employee is entitled Report of the Committee to Investigate the
Effects of Police Arrest Records on Unemployment in the District of Columbia
(1967), commonly referred to as the Duncan Report. The Duncan Report found
that use of arrest records by prospective employers was widespread and the
consequences of a person having been arrested, even if the charges were
subsequently dismissed, were severe. Most employers could not discern that
several notations really related to one arrest. Others did not understand the
disposition. The Duncan Report also noted that 60% to 90% of the male
working population in some predominantly black areas of the District of
Columbia were systematically excluded from between 25% to 50% of the jobs
available to them in relation to their skills because of records of arrests without
convictions. There was a similar effect on a person's chances for government
employment, and for obtaining some city licenses and permits.
31. 328 F. Supp. 718, 723 (D.D.C. 1971). A recent federal case, however, mistakenly read the Menard
court as ruling that there was no probable cause for Menard's arrest. The court then denied expungement
based on this faulty premise. Coleman v. United States Dep't of Justice, 429 F. Supp. 411, 412-413
(N.D. Ind. 1977).
32. 328 F. Supp. 718, 728 (D.D.C. 1971). This injunction was quickly overruled legislatively when Senator
Bible of Nevada, worried about the inability of casino operators in Las Vegas to run F.B.I. checks
on prospective employees, sponsored a rider to the F.B.I. criminal records for employment and licensing
purposes when authorized by state or, local statute. See Act of Dec. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-184,
85 Stat. 642 (1971); Act of Oct. 25, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-544, 86 Stat. 1109 (1972).
33. 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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Further evidence of the attitude of employers against hiring exonerated
arrestees is found in Miller's study, The Closed Door: The Effect of a Criminal
Record on Employment with State and Local Agencies. 34 This 1972 study
indicated that 77% of the job application forms for state or local civil service
asked about arrests. Twenty percent of the responding agencies said that an
arrest record without a conviction was grounds for not hiring. 35
Another study showed that approximately 75% of the New York City area
employment agencies sampled did not refer an applicant with a record, regardless
of whether the arrest was followed by a conviction. 36 In another study,37 two-thirds
of the employers surveyed would not consider employing a man acquitted of
assault charges, even for the lowest level of unskilled positions. Another study
discussed the hiring of extra postal workers during the Christmas season. The
Postmaster of San Francisco revealed that one of his criteria was "We don't
want to be bothered with anybody who has a record of arrest. ' 38 An article
entitled The Expungement Myth 39 candidly pointed out most employers' attitude
that exonerated arrestees probably "got off on some technical loophole."' 39
When the state of New York passed a statute requiring all employees of
security firms to be fingerprinted for security check, several hundred employees
were found to have "criminal records" and dismissed from their employment.
Half of those fired had only records of arrest not resulting in conviction. 40
The lack of dispositions on arrest records also hurts the exonerated arrestee
seeking employment. Such lack of vital data makes it appear that the prospective
employee is "still in trouble with the law." If an employer can find someone
not bothered by what appears to be pending criminal legal action he will
certainly choose him over the exonerated arrestee. As the Colorado Supreme
Court noted in Davidson v. Dill, when two or more applicants apply for the
same job, those with previous arrest records, "clearly stand in a less favorable
position than do other applicants."'41
Those injured most by arrest records in the area of employment are
minorities. One of the most controversial cases touching upon the issue of
minorities with arrest records being barred from employment is Gregory v.
Litton Systems. 42 In Gregory, the district court held that employers violated
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196443 by denying employment to persons
with arrest records. The court made factual findings that such a practice in
effect disqualified a higher proportion of blacks than whites. The court stated:
There is no evidence to support a claim that persons who have suffered no
criminal convictions but have been arrested on a number of occasions can be
expected, when employed, to perform less efficiently or less honestly than
other employees . . . . Thus, information concerning a prospective employee's
record of arrests without convictions is irrelevent to his suitability or qualifications
for employment. 44
34. Miller, The Closed Door: The Effect of a Criminal Record on Employment with Local Agencies, Georgetown
University Law Institute (1972).
35. Id. at 34.
36. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice Report: The Challenge
of Crime in a Free Society 75 (1967).
37. Schwartz & Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10 Soc. Prob. 133, 136 (1962).
38. Hearings Before the California Assembly Comm. on Criminal Procedure (June 10, 1964).
39. 38 Los Angeles Bar Bulletin 161 (1963).
40. N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1970, at § 1, at 1, col. 2; Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 1970, at 17, col. 1.
41. 503 P.2d 157, 159 (1972).
42. 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), modified, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), et seq. (1964).
44. 316 F. Supp. 401, 402-403 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
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Three decisions by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission have held
that asking blacks about arrest records or minor convictions is discriminatory
per se. 45 Although these cases apply directly to private employers, they do
not protect the exonerated arrestee. For an employer may bypass the purpose
of the holding in Gregory simply by requesting felony conviction information.
Such a request will result in the employer receiving a complete rap sheet from
the F.B.I., regardless of whether the employee has a felony conviction. Also,
many employers are statutorily authorized to receive criminal records or to
condition employment on a waiver by the applicant of any statutes prohibiting
dissemination. If the arrests are the true grounds for rejection there is a heavy
burden on the arrestee to prove that the mere fact of a prior arrest was the
actual reason for rejection. The root of the problem in enforcing the spirit of
Gregory was noted in Utz v. Cullinane, 46
If it is illegal for employers (including state and local government employers
who are within the ambit of Title VII) to utilize arrest records not culminating
in convictions to deny an individual opportunities open to those with no such
record, it would appear to be just as illegal for the government to furnish
the employer with the information on which such illegal actions may be based,
at least when there is no legitimate law enforcement justification for providing
the employer with the data.
The court added,
If a governmental unit discriminates in employment through the utilization of
arrest records the rights it would be abridging would be constitutional rights;
the private sector employer, on the other hand is only prevented from
discrimating because of Congressional action. Nevertheless, where govern-
ment action facilitates private discrimation, constitutional strictures should
apply. 47
Reputation
In addition to employment considerations, advocates of expungement espouse
the right of an exonerated arrestee to be free from injury to his reputation.
In that context, maintenance and dissemination of arrest records not resulting
in conviction may state a cause of action in tort for defamation or invasion
of privacy. 48 When one of the 15,000 private or public agencies authorized to
receive F.B.I. criminal records, or thousands of other authorized recipients
( e.g., state Bar Associations) of state and local arrest records,49 requests an
applicant's "criminal record," the F.B.I. or State Criminal Identification Bureau
forwards from their computerized "criminal history" data bank the "rap sheet"
or "criminal history." At common law, the labeling of a person as a "criminal"
was defamation per se. 50 The effect of unconsented distribution of an arrest
citation as a "criminal record" is similar to that of defamation, i.e., to
45. Decision No. 71-1950, EPD § 6274 (Apr. 29, 1971); Decision No. 71-2089, EPD § 6253 (May 19,
1973); Decision No. 71-2682, EPD § 6288 (June 28, 1971).
46. 520 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
47. Id. at 482. See also N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
48. In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), discussed earlier, Justice Rehnquist rejected privacy and
defamation claims based upon constitutional rights but expressly stated that the state could be sued
in tort.
49. See Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
50. Hanson v. Krehbiel, 68 Kan. 670, 75 P. 1041 (1904); Brewer v. Chare, 121 Mich. 526, 80 N.W.
575 (1899).
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damage the reputation of the citizen in his community, especially in his dealings
with employers. 51 The designation of a mere arrest record as a "criminal
record" or a "criminal history" is contrary to fact and arguably beyond the
scope of the F.B.I.'s statutory authority to collect criminal records. 52
On the basis of the legislative history of the Act authorizing the F.B.I.
to maintain and disseminate arrest records, 53 the Act can be construed not to
include arrest records which do not result in conviction within its ambit. This
initial statutory authorization, subsequently repealed, was limited to the
acquisition and preservation of "criminal identification and other crime
records."' 54 The present Act states that: "The legislative purpose in enacting
sections 1-6 of this Act is to restate, without substantive change, the laws
replaced by those sections of the effective date of this Act."' 55 Apparently
under the clause, "and other records", the F.B.I. is allowed to keep an
exonerated arrestee's records with criminal records. Such an interpretation
creates a substantive change from the repealed statute, contrary to the stated
legislative intent.
Privacy
An individual's right to protect his reputation is concomitant with his right
of privacy. There are at least three types of invasion of privacy 56 in which an
unconvicted arrestee might find a cause of action against a law enforcement
agency for exposure of his arrest record, whether as an arrest record or a
"criminal" record:
(1) Intrusion upon plaintiff's seclusion or solitude,.or into his private affairs;
(2) Public disclosure of private embarrassing facts; and
(3) Publicity places plaintiff in false light in public eye.
It may be a violation of privacy to place one in a false light in the public
eye when there is inclusion of plaintiff's name, photograph, and fingerprints
in a public gallery of convicted criminals when in fact one has not been
convicted. "Although the police are clearly privileged to make such a record
in the first instance, and to use it for only legitimate purposes pending trial,
or even after a conviction, the element of false publicity in the inclusion among
the convicted goes beyond the privilege."' 57 Going one step further, there may
be an affirmative duty to remove a libelous publication made by another. 58 Thus,
there is a direct correlation between the loss of individual privacy and retention
of arrest records. 59
51. "A communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm him in the estimation of the community or
to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him." Restatement of Torts § 559 (1938).
52. Cf. Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1950); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400
U.S. 433 (1971). (In these case's the Court used similar reasoning.)
53. Department of Justice Appropriations Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 534(a) (1970).
54. Department of Justice Appropriations Act of 1965, 5 U.S.C. § 340 (1965) (repealed, 1966).
55. Department of Justice Appropriations Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 7(a) (1970).
56. Prosser, Privacy, 49 Cal. L. Rev. 383 (1960).
57. Id. at 399-400.
58. Prosser & Wade, Torts 873 (5th ed. 1971).
59. United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.C.P.R. 1967) examines this correlation.
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One court of appeals followed this reasoning when it stated:
When arrested, an accused does not have a constitutional right of privacy
that outweighs the necessity of protecting society and the accumulation of this
data, no matter how mistaken the arrest may have been. However, when an
ac-used is acquitted of the crime or when he is discharged without conviction,
no public good is accomplished by the retention of criminal identification
records. On the other hand, a great imposition is placed upon the citizen. His
privacy and personal dignity is invaded as long as the Justice Department
retains "criminal" identification records, "criminal" arrest, fingerprints and a
rogue's gallery photograph. 60
Other Consequences
In addition to the detrimental effects an arrest record has on an exonerated
arrestee's employment prospects, reputation, and privacy, there are personal
and psychological consequences as well. He will be subjected to scrutiny not
only in employment but also in applying for a license,61 schooling, 62 and by
the police. His ability to secure credit 63 is hampered by the listing of an arrest
at the credit bureau. The arrestee's decision to take the witness stand in his
own defense in a criminal case or as a witness or party in a civil or criminal
case, will be made with extreme caution for fear of "opening the door" and
involving his character in the issues, thereby subjecting his arrests to expo-
sure. 64 Psychological studies have indicated that once an individual is labeled
a "criminal," he begins to assume the role attributed to him.65 One author
has stated:
When he is effectively ostracized, the criminal has only two alternatives: he
may associate with other criminals, among whom he can find prestige, and
means of further criminality; or he may become disorganized, psychopathic,
or unstable. Our current practice is to permit almost all criminals to return
to society, in a physical sense, but to hold them off, make them keep their
distance, segregate them in the midst of the ordinary community.66
Another study suggested that police records play a determinative role in the
process by which the marginal delinquent matures into the role of a confirmed
recidivist. 67 Examples of this labeling can be found in statutes and court cases
dealing with expungement. For example, in Florida, the expungement statute
is entitled the First Offenders Act. 68 The New Mexico statute, which prohibits
dissemination of non-conviction data to licensing boards and public and private
60. Id. at 970.
61. McAvoy v. La. St. Bd. of Medical Examiners, 238 La. 502, 115 So. 833 (1959).
62. Due v. Florida A. & M., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963).
63. Fite v. Retail Credit Co., 386 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Mont. 1975). In Fite, the court allowed full disclosure
of juvenile arrest records to a credit bureau. For other discussions involving arrest records and credit
bureaus see V. Packard, The Naked Society 54 (1964); Note, Arrest and Credit Records: Can the
Right of Privacy Survive?, 24 U. Fla. L. Rev. 681 (1972).
64. Fed. R. Evid. 404, 405.
65. Some sources on the labeling theory are: V. Eisner, The Deliquency Label (1969); E. Lemert, Social
Pathology (1951); Payne, Negative Labels: Passageways and Prisons, 19 Crime & Deliquency 33
(1973).
66. E. Sutherland & D. Cressy, Principles of Criminology 354 (8th ed. 1970). Failure to restrict dissemination
disregards the individual's psychological interest in preventing disclosure of personal information and
undermines the basic concepts of intimacy, role playing and autonomy. See Project, The
Computerization of Government Files: What Impact on the Individual? 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1371,
1411-25 (1968).
67. Gold & Williams, National Study of the Aftermath of Apprehension, 3 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 3 (1969).
68. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 901.33 (West 1977).
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employers, is called The Criminal Offender Employment Act. 69 In judicial
decisions such as Loder70, discussed previously, many references are made to
the exonerated arrestees as "offenders". An example of this can be found in
the Loder court's holding that there is a compelling state interest in the
retention and dissemination of arrest records in "the promotion of more efficient
law enforcement and criminal justice; more specifically, the state's purpose is
to protect the public from recidivist offenders."' 71 The Loder court com-
pounded their labeling when it found that in utilizing arrest records, "in certain
circumstances a pattern may emerge showing modus operandi - which has
independent significance as a basis for suspecting the arrestee if the crime is
committed again." 72
Perhaps the most perplexing adverse use of arrest records occurs within
the criminal justice system itself. Judges, prosecutors, and police, who are
legally trained in interpreting arrest records and who are constitutionally bound
to interpret them by the presumption of innocence standard, have often used
the presumption of guilt standard. On the one hand, judges use strong language
in denouncing the value of arrest records not resulting in conviction. For
example, in United States v. Dooley, the court said,
[C]harges resulting in acquittal clearly have no legitimate significance.
Likewise, other charges which the government fails or refuses to press or
which it withdraws are entitled to no greater legitimacy. They lose any tendency
to show probable cause and should not be bootstrapped into any unearned
and undeserved significance. Actually, a collection of dismissed, abandoned or
withdrawn arrest records are no more than gutter rumors when measured
against any standard of constitutional fairness to an individual and, along with
records resulting in acquittal are not entitled to any law enforcement credibility
whatsoever.73
Despite these assertions, judges use mere arrest records in setting bail,74 sentenc-
ing, 75 and denying probation, 76 and in determining whether a defendant's
testimony is impeached by prior convictions.77 Use of arrest records in sentencing
and denying probation or by parole boards in denying parole 78 raises serious
constitutional questions. In United States v. Tucker, 79 the Supreme Court
ruled that a conviction obtained against any defendant who was not represented
by counsel could not be used against that defendant either to support guilt
or enhance punishment for another offense. In United States v. Miller 80, a
district court held that the Tucker rule meant that any conviction obtained
69. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-2-1 et seq. (1978).
70. Loder v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal. 3d 859, 553 P.2d 624 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1109 (1977).
71. Id. at 628.
72. Id. at 629.
73. 364 F. Supp. 75, 77 (E.D. Pa. 1973); see also Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232,
241 (1957).
74. Russell v. United States, 402 F.2d 185, 186-87 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Rhodes v. United States, 275 F.2d
78, 81-82 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 912 (1969). See also Loder v. Municipal Court,
553 P.2d 624, 630, n.3 (1976).
75. United States v. Isaac, 299 F. Supp. 380 (D.D.C. 1969); United States v. Cifarelli, 401 F.2d 512
(2nd Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 987 (1962); United States v. Delaney, 442 F.2d 120 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
76. People v. Peterson, 9 Cal. 3d 717, 725-26, 511 P. 1187 (1973).
77. Suggs v. U.S., 407 F.2d 1272, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Gordon v. U.S., 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir.
1967). See also Michelson v. U.S., 355 U.S. 469 (1948).
78. Azeria v. California Adult Authority, 193 Cal. App. 2d 1, 5 (1961).
79. 404 U.S. 443, 339 (1972).
80. 361 F. Supp. 825 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
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without representation by counsel could not be considered in the sentencing-
process. 81 The essence of the holdings in these decisions was that no presumption
of guilt should be drawn from such convictions. In light of the Supreme
Court's reasoning, the issue is raised whether the courts should allow examination
of any arrest not resulting in conviction as part of the sentencing decision. A
person arrested and subsequently dismissed before ever going to trial or found
not guilty should not be subjected to harsher sentencing for a subsequent crime
any more than a person convicted who was not represented by counsel.
Prosecutors also use arrest records in determining whether to charge a
person, whether to plea bargain, whether to exclude a prospective juror and
how to categorize the offense to be charged. 82 Thus, the exonerated arrestee
will be subject to disparate treatment at this level as well.
Of these harmful uses, the exclusion of an exonerated arrestee from jury
duty is the most significant. Certainly a prosecutor will not want a juror who
has had any confrontation with police. This, too, raises a complex constitutional
issue. If women and blacks cannot be systematically excluded from juries, it
seems to follow that exonerated arrestees also should not be excluded.
The most common adverse utilization of an arrest record is by law
enforcement. The most obvious use by police is that of fingerprints on the
arrest card. This is a valuable investigative tool and when used with aliases,
former addresses, and sometimes photographs, they can aid police in the
detection of crime and protection of society. 83 The Menard case, however,
provided a remedy whereby the competing interests of law enforcement and
the individual can both be served. The fingerprints can be "neutralized" by
deleting any reference to the arrest from the fingerprint card (and computers),
leaving the name, aliases, and addresses on the card and placing it in the
non-criminal section of the Identification Division where fingerprints and
photographs for such things as passport applications, licenses, and government
employment, are maintained. Thus, through "neutralization" the police still
have their valuable investigative tool and the exonerated arrestee is relieved
from any stigma of an arrest record.
Police also use arrest records to develop probable cause. As stated in the
Loder case, "An arrest record may be a valuable investigative tool, as when
a prior arrest is merely one of a series of arrests of the same individual on
the same or related charges. Suspicion focused by such a pattern will justify
additional investigation. Coupled with independent evidence of criminal
involvement, it may amount to probable cause to arrest."' 84 This partial
development of probable cause based on arrest records85 reverts back to the
unconstitutional presumption of guilt that the courts, prosecutors and employers
81. See also Lipscomb v. Clark, 468 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1972); Brown v. U.S., 483 F.2d 116 (4th Cir.
1973).
82. D. Newman, Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or Innocence Without Trial 116 (1966); Sledge
v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 70, 75, 520 P.2d 412 (1974). (Prior narcotics arrests not resulting in
conviction can be used by prosecutor in determining whether to divert into an alternate program of
treatment or rehabilitation.) See also Goldstein, Police Discretion not to Invoke the Criminal Process:
Low Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice. 69 Yale L.J. 543 (1960); Couser v. State,
282 Md. 125, 383 A.2d 389, 396 (1978); Losavio v. Mayber, 496 P.2d 1032 (Colo. 1972).
83. J. Edgar Hoover, The Role of Identification in Law Enforcement: An Historical Adventure, 46 St.
John's Law Review 613 (1972).
84. 553 P.2d 624, 629 (1976).
85. W. La Fave, Arrest: The Decision to Take a Suspect into Custody, 287-88 (1965). It is difficult for
police to draw any inferences from arrest records because a recent internal audit of F.B.I. records
showed that less than 50% of arrest entries in their computer (Ident) had dispositions. Disposition
Systems and Procedures - Feasibility Study, Final Report, November 11, 1976, Identification Bureau,
F.B.I. (But in a recent interview C.C.H. Supervisor claimed this number was down to 27%.)
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often rely upon in their decision-making process. This development of probable
cause also assumes that the ability of the computerized rap sheet to document
the past criminal behavior of an arrestee is accurate, when in fact, the opposite
more often is true. Police and prosecutors will bring more serious charges or
less serious charges against a person depending on his or her cooperation,
personality, past arrest record and other factors. They are also limited to
certain charging categories. Even when a person is convicted, plea bargaining
often makes it unlikely that the charge at conviction reflects the nature of
the criminal event. And since plea bargaining is more prevalent in urban than
rural areas, the rural offender, committing the same crime as the urban
offender, will probably look much worse on paper.
Finally, the Loder case cites some California case law which allowed prior
arrests as part of the probable cause formula.8 6 One must wonder how effective
this procedure is in California (and elsewhere) considering that in 1962, 750,000
adults were arrested in that state, of which only 180,000 had further action
taken against them.8 7 In New York in 1965, 45% of persons arrested for
felonies were released without charges having been filed.88 Even the national
average is not much better if conviction rates may be interpreted to reflect
somewhat the existence of probable cause, for 40% of the 6 million adult
arrests in 1976 resulted in no conviction. 89 Thus, it is evident that utilization
of arrest records by police in the formation of probable cause has not been
a successful practice. Expungement of records of arrests not resulting in
conviction might even improve the quality of arrests for police would have to
focus on probable cause at the time of each arrest.90
Another law enforcement use of arrest records is for statistical data to aid
in analyzing high crime areas, patrol procedures and employment of personnel.
This can be accomplished, however, without use of an arrestee's name.
The final argument raised by law enforcement for retaining criminal records
is that consulting an arrest record before apprehending a person could inform
the officer of a person's violent tendencies and save police lives. Recent statistics
do not bear this out. In 1976, 111 police officers out of 418,000 were killed
in action.91  Most were killed in situations where neither the
suspect nor his criminal record were known (i.e., family quarrels and crimes
in progress). 92
In summary, the adverse effects of the use of arrest records by employers,
courts, prosecutors, police, licensing agencies and a plethora of others have
been well documented in studies made within the past few years. Law
enforcement's need for fingerprints, statistics, photographs, aliases, and former
addresses can be satisfied by neutralizing the arrest record. This in turn would
86. 553 P.2d 624, 629 (1976).
87. Cal. Bureau of Criminal Statistics, Crime in California, 1962, 47, 53, 75, 85 (1963).
88. Governor Nelson Rockefeller's Conference on Crime 23 (1966).
89. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports 1976 at 215 (1977).
90. Expert testimony discussing arrest propensities because of probable cause based on arrest records can
be found in Gregory v. Litton Systems, 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), modified, 472 F.2d 631
(9th Cir. 1972). The testimony indicated that a person arrested once tends to accumulate additional
arrests. The lifetime average for a white male is 7 arrests, and for a black male, 12.5.
91. Supra note 89, at 288.
92. Id. at 288, 290.
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also remove the proven damaging effects on the innocent arrestee. Adverse
action taken against an individual by police, prosecutors, and the courts is
based on certain assumptions regarding the meaning of the arrest. In so far
as these assumptions and presumptions differ from reality because of the
cryptic, misleading information contained on the rap sheet due to prosecutorial
discretion in charging arrestees, the adverse action will have an erroneous
basis.
Use by the courts of arrest records in denying probation and in sentencing
may well be an unconstitutional practice in light of Tucker and Miller. The
American Bar Association's Advisory Committee on Sentencing and Review
has strongly recommended the exclusion, from pre-sentencing reports to be
used in sentencing and probation, of any mention of arrests not leading to
conviction. 93 Thus, it appears that the uses of arrest records which have been
a stumbling block to millions of Americans are either ineffective, unconstitutional
or can be accommodated by neutralization without harming the individual and
without depriving police of an investigative tool.
CONCLUSION
In attempting to solve the arrest record problem, the legislatures, Congress,
and the courts have tried to reconcile the competing interests involved by
limiting dissemination. The result has been a failure to put controls on the
numerous criminal record data banks. This failure stems from inherent problems
within the system itself. First, there are 15,000 authorized recipients of F.B.I.
records alone, who combined with those who have legal and illegal94 access
to the 10,000 state and local law enforcement agencies' data banks (Massachusetts
alone has 150 authorized recipients of their state criminal record data) make
the scope of the problem immense. The problem lies in the F.B.I.'s "property"
concept regarding the criminal data stored in their central repository. Although
the state which owns the property (criminal record) may have a statute
prohibiting release of this data to anyone but police, if another state has a
statute authorizing access to F.B.I. records, the latter statute will control and
the record will be sent.
The unwieldly number of recipients creates the related problem of security.
It is virtually impossible for the F.B.I. to oversee state and local criminal
record computers or even their own, despite heavy sanctions for illegal
dissemination. In the 50 years the F.B.I. has been collecting arrest records,
only six cases of violations have ever been reported with punishment ranging
from two weeks to one year of restricted use of F.B.I. criminal records. 95 Restricted
dissemination has not protected the privacy of exonerated arrestees.
The system of labeling and grouping arrest records not resulting in conviction
as "criminal records" often results in exonerated arrestees being treated and
acting as criminals. The disasterous effects of an arrest record on employment
opportunities have been discussed above. Use of arrest records by police as
93. Advisory Comm. on Sentencing and Review, ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards
Relating to Probation § 2.3 at 37 (1970).
94. See. e.g., Security & Privacy of Criminal Arrest Records: Hearings on H.R. 13315, Before Subcomm.
No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 173 (1972).
95. S. Ungar, F.B.I. 622-24 (1976).
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an investigative tool or for partial development of probable cause has resulted
in low quality arrests which result in a low conviction rate and waste of time
by police, prosecutors, and the courts. Use of arrest records by the courts in
denying probation and in sentencing raises grave constitutional questions. The
arrestee is personally affected in licensing, credit, schooling, jury duty and
being a witness, particularly in his own defense at a criminal trial.
The federal courts have generally narrowed expungement relief in absence
of statute to situations involving mass arrests or unconstitutional arrests.
Obtaining this relief is time-consuming and costly to the exonerated arrestee.
Although numerous proposals for regulation of criminal justice data banks
with mild expungement clauses attached have been introduced in Congress,
none have been enacted into law.
Few states have actual expungement statutes and those that do, place
unnecessary conditions to be met for those seeking this remedy. Because many
of these statutes are poorly drafted, plaintiffs must engage in costly, time-consuming
litigation regarding definitions of "expungement." And while there is a certain
value and necessity in flexibility in statutory draftmanship, unfortunately, in
this area, the gaps have been filled with state court rulings unfavorable to
the exonerated arrestee.
The Task Force Report on Science & Technology of the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice concluded
that the retention of records of arrest or conviction for unreasonable lengths
of time may interfere with rehabilitation goals.96 Dealing specifically with arrest
records, the committee noted three serious problems in their use:)
(1) The record may contain incomplete or incorrect information.
(2) The information may fall into the wrong hands and may be used to
intimidate or embarrass.
(3) The information may be retained long after it has lost its usefulness
and serves only to harass the ex-offenders or its mere existence may
diminish an offender's belief in the possibility of redemption.
There exists, therefore, a serious need for federal remedial legislation. While
enforcement of criminal law and operation of criminal justice information
systems are primarily the responsibility of state or local government, a federal
statute is appropriate because of the failure of most states to provide significant
relief in this area. A corrective statute could be enacted by Congress by:
(1) Placing reasonable conditions on the grant of federal money or receipt
of federal services (both of which are received by virtually all state
and local criminal justice agencies).
(2) Legislating under the commerce powers.
(3) Regulating the use of the means of interstate communication.
(4) Enforcing the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment.
96. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice Report, The Challenge of
Crime in a Free Society 74-77 (1967).
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Such legislation should not ignore legitimate needs for effective law
enforcement. These needs can be met adequately by allowing for the retention
of the fingerprint cards and photographs of arrestees, as long as they are kept
in the "neutral" files of both the F.B.I. Identification Division and various
state and local agencies and removing all traces of arrest from the card. Thus,
the fingerprints, photographs, addresses, aliases, birth date, sex, and other
"investigative tools" would be available for law enforcement use but not for
the basis of an inference of guilt of an exonerated arrestee.
The administrative costs of the expungement procedure can be kept at a
minimum by expunging (neutralizing the fingerprint card and photograph and
erasing the arrest-from all automated or manual records) arrests not resulting
in conviction when an inquiry is made by an authorized recipient before sending
the criminal record to the recipient. This avoids any hiring of extra employees
to search through the 23 million individual criminal records to find arrests
with no convictions. Alternatively, or in conjunction with the above process,
the exonerated arrestee may pay the $5.00 fee currently charged to have access
and review of his record, and upon retrieval, but before sending, the F.B.I.,
state and local agencies can expunge it, again avoiding the need for extra
personnel and wasteful duplication of effort. While this does not expunge all
arrests not resulting in conviction, there is no harm to those persons whose
records are not consulted by police or disseminated to employers.
For most of those arrested and not convicted, too poor, too ignorant of
their rights or too disheartened to complain, the time is ripe for relief and
release from the living conditions of the "records prison." Certainly, as one
Texas court stated, "[Eixpungement of arrest records is truly a legislative
matter that should be dealt with by Congress, and this court is hopeful that
it will be."'97
Michael E. Mazurek*Jo-Ellen Holm Mazurek**
*B.A., University of Illinois, 1972; J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law
School, 1979.
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97. United States v. Singleton, 442 F. Supp. 722, 724 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
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APPENDIX
STATE EXPUNGEMENT STATUTES
The following chart is a current survey (April, 1979) of state expungement
statutes. "Brief description/limitations" refers to capsulized summaries of State
Supreme Court interpretations of the statute. Most of the statutes are silent
or unclear as to which law enforcement agencies (federal, state, local) are to
perform what tasks (expunge, seal, etc.). Additional information was obtained
by interview.
Key to Symbols/Abbreviations
* = If a statute only requires return of fingerprints/photos, such return
from the F.B.I. automatically expunges that arrest from all F.B.I.
records (computerized, manual, and alphabetically indexed) regardless
of the statute or court rulings prohibiting expungement. The F.B.I.
will not maintain any record of arrest for which there is no
accompanying fingerprint card. State/local record not expunged.
** - If a state has a sealing statute, the usual practice is that the state
notifies the F.B.I. of the sealing. The F.B.I. then returns the
fingerprints/photos to the arresting police and expunges the arrest
from the F.B.I. records and computers, regardless of statutory or
judicial limits to sealing and prohibitions against expungement. The
F.B.I. has no sealed records, but state/local do.
St. A.G.O. = State Attorney General Opinion regarding the statute (not
legally binding).
Fpts./photos = Fingerprints and photographs of arrestee
nolle prosse = nolle prosequi (unwilling to prosecute)
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State & Statute 1 2 3 4 5 Description/Limitations
Alabama 1 2 Anyone "cleared" of arrest or released without charge
Ala. Code has all information "eliminated" and "removed."
§ 41-9-625 (1975)
Alaska Though statute refers to "purging" criminal records, such
Alaska Rev. Stat. "removal" is at the discretion of the Governor's Commission
§ 12-62-040 (1972) on the Admin. of Justice.
Arizona I 2** 3 5 Arrestee petitions court to clear record if arrestee
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. "wrongfully arrested". If petition granted, state records§ 13-4051 (1978) are sealed. Released only with court order (except police).
Beasley v. Glenn, 110 Az. 438, 520 P.2d 310 (1974) held
no destruction.
Arkansas 1 2 4 5 No statute for expungement of non-conviction records.
Ark. Stat. Ann. Expungement statute applies only to convicted first§ 43-1231 et seq. offenders whose sentence is probation. Can be used only(1975) once. Must have no prior convictions. Sealed records
available only to police and judiciary. Convicted may say
never convicted to employers, licensors, permit grantors.
California 1 2 State Bureau of Criminal Identification began expungement
Cal. Penal Code program in 1974 whereby all misdemeanor arrests not§ 849.5 (1975) resulting in conviction and "detentions" are automatically
851.6 (1970) expunged from all law enforcement agency records, 5§ 8years from date of arrest if no arrests during the waiting
§ 851.8 (1975) period. All felony arrests not resulting in conviction and
all misdemeanor convictions are expunged after 7 year
waiting period. An arrest during the waiting period starts
waiting period over again.
849.5 Defines "detention" as an arrest without a warrant
where no accusatory pleading is filed.
851.6 Says "detention" is not an arrest so the arrest
record must be termed "detention record." This still
appears on state rap sheet, but not on F.B.I. record.
851.8 If defendant acquitted and court deems person is
actually innocent, court may order the record sealed.
Colorado NONE LOCATED
Connecticut 1 2 5 Although 54-142(a) (9) specifically says upon favorable
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. disposition to arrestee all records are automatically§ 54-142(a) et seq. "erased"; in practice, F.B.I. record is expunged, but(1978) state/local police and court records are sealed. Sealed
records are disclosed to anyone authorized by statute to
receive this data.
Delaware NONE LOCATED
Florida 1 2 3 4 5 Confidential computerized record maintained by state
Fla. Stat. Ann. police, with only law enforcement having access to it. State
§ 901.33 (1977) v. Zawistowski, 339 So.2d 315 (1976), held that no prior
conviction rule bars expungement of arrests occurring
after the conviction only, arrests before the conviction
are expungable.
F.B.I. Fpts. & Photos Returned/Destroyed
F.B.I. Arrest Rec. Expunged
Arrestee Must Petition Court
No Prior Convictions
State Records Sealed - Not Expunged
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State & Statute 1 2 3 4 5 Description/Limitations
Georgia NONE LOCATED
Hawaii 1 2** 4 5 Exonerated arrestee applies to State Attorney General
Hawaii Rev. Star. for fingerprints to be returned. State records are sealed§831-3.1 et seq. (1974) and available to the courts for sentencing and to the
Federal Government for jobs affecting national security.
Persons may say never arrested.
Idaho 1 2* 3 "Fingerprint Record" returned to unconvicted arrestee
Idaho Code upon judicial order.
§ 19-4813(1) (1974)
Illinois 1 2* 3 4 People v. Glisson, 69 I. 2d 502, 372 N.E. 2d 669 (1978)
Ill. Ann. Stat. held that an arrestee is entitled to return of fingerprints
§ 38-206-5 (1975) and photos for any arrest not resulting in conviction, but
no expungement if arrestee has prior conviction. Same
case ruled that a pardon still bars both expungement and
fpt. return. Arrestee must petition court for either remedy
(fingerprint return or expungement).
Indiana 1 2* 4 Arrestee, in writing, demands police to expunge, return
Ind. Ann. Stat'. fingerprints and photos. Available only if no charges
§ 35-4-8-1 (1977) preferred, dismissal due to mistaken identity, no probable
cause for arrest found by court, or no offense in fact
having been committed. Arrestee must have no prior
convictions or arrests. Must not have any pending charges.
Statute is silent on other dispositions (nolle prosse, not
guilty, etc.).
Iowa 1 2* 4 5 Although § 749.2 specifically allows for destruction of
Iowa Code Ann. exonerated arrestee's fingerprints if no prior convictions,§ 749.2 (1939) Iowa Supreme Court ruled no expungement of arrest
§ 602.15 (1975) record (State v. Fish, 265 N.W. 2d 737 (1978)).
§ 602.15 allows expungement of court records.
Kansas 1 2 3 5 No expungement statute for exonerated arrestee. Expungement
Kansas Stat. Ann. remedy in cited statute is annulment of a conviction.
§ 21-4619 (1978) F.B.I. record is expunged, state record sealed. Person
§ 12-4516 (1978) may say never convicted.
Convict must wait 2 years from release" date for this
relief if convicted of a misdemeanor or certain felonies,
5 years for other felonies. Must not have any felony
conviction during waiting period and must not have any
pending criminal prosecution. "Expunged" conviction can't
be used against person in licensing or employment (except
in employment as a private detective or private patrol);
but can be used for sentencing for another crime.
Dissemination of this record is limited.
Kentucky § 17.110 says police can take fingerprints for felony
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. arrests only, but State Att'y Gen'l. Opinion says applicable
§ 17.110 (1958) to misdemeanor arrests also.
§ 433.234(2) (1974) § 433.234 says send fingerprints and record of shoplifting
arrestee to State Criminal Identification Bureau only if
convicted.
F.B.I. Fpts. & Photos Returned/Destroyed
F.B.I. Arrest Rec. Expunged
Arrestee Must Petition Court
No Prior Convictions
State Records Sealed - Not Expunged
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State & Statute 1 2 [3 ]4 15 Description/Limitations
Louisiana
La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 44:9 (1970)
Code of Crim. Pro.
Article 894 (1972)
Maine
Maryland
Md. Ann. Code
§ 27-735, 737 (1975)
Massachusetts
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
§ 276 § 100(C) (1973)
§ 276 §100(A) (1971)
Any exonerated arrestee, upon motion to court, can have
arrest record destroyed by all law enforcement agencies
who have it. Fingerprints and photos also destroyed.
Expungement order kept by arresting police under lock
and key for internal record keeping purposes and to
preserve integrity of the expunging agency. Can't be used
for investigative or any other purposes.
Art. § 894 provides above expungement relief to those
convicted of misdemeanors who receive a suspended
sentence or probation. Must have no convictions during
probation period. Conviction can be used against person
as a habitual offender, and this statute can be used only
once every 5 years. Though F.B.I. record is expunged,
state police keep confidential record for 2 limited purposes
(habitual offender & use once every 5 years).
NONE LOCATED
Expungement defined as removal of criminal record from
public inspection. In practice, it is expunged from all
files. Arrestee must wait three years for this relief if
disposition of case was other than acquittal or dismissal.
(Ward v. State, 37 Md. App. 34, 375 A. 2d 41 (1977)
held a nolle prosse disposition requires three year wait.)
No waiting period if conviction reversed. Must have no
convictions during three year waiting period and no
pending criminal prosecution. No fee to arrestee for this
remedy.
276 § 100(C) Court and police records are sealed if
arrestee found not guilty or if the court finds no probable
cause for the arrest. Any other exonerating disposition
(nolle prosse, dismissal, etc.) requires court finding it to
be in the best interests of justice to seal. Arrestee makes
sealing request to probation commissioner. Any inquiries
other than by police or courts will be told person has no
record. Courts do not have access to records with "not
guilty" dispositions or records of arrest where no probable
cause found.
276 § 100(A) Provides sealing of conviction records
(court and police) after waiting period (15 years from
end of sentence for felony, 10 years for misdemeanor).
Must -have no prior convictions and no arrests during
waiting period. An arrest during waiting period starts
period over again. Person can say never arrested or
convicted, but record can be used in sentencing and by
police. Can also be used to deny license to sell or carry
guns. (Rzeznik v. Chief of Police. 373 N.E. 2d 1128
(1978)).
Statute provides for automatic expungement and fingerprint
return. Must have no prior convictions. If arrested for
certain child sex offenses and subsequently exonerated,
then judge must order expungement - not automatic in
these cases.
F.B.I. Fpts. & Photos Returned/Destroyed
F.B.I. Arrest Rec. Expunged
Arrestee Must Petition Court
No Prior Convictions
State Records Sealed - Not Expunged
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A Comparative Summary
State & Statute 1 2 3 4 5 Description/Limitations
Minnesota 1 2 4 299c. 11 Provides for return of fingerprints to defendant
Minn. Stat. Ann. with any favorable disposition. Must make request to
§ 299c.11 (1957) police and must have no felony convictions in past 10
§ 638.02 (1974) years. In re R.L.F., 256 N.W. 2d 803 (1977) held arrest
records also expunged.
638.02 provides annulment of conviction and sealing of
records upon receipt of pardon.
Mississippi NONE LOCATED
Missouri 1 2** 5 610.100 If arrestee not formally charged 30 days from
Mo. Ann. Stat. arrest, arrest record "closed" to all except him for a
§ 610.100 (1973) year. If no conviction in that year, it is automatically
expunged. Available only in a city or county with population
§ 610.105 (1973) of 500,000 or more. (But only two counties meet this
§ 610.110 (1973) condition, so only their records are expunged.) All other
counties "close" their records, and are accessible only to
arrestee and police. Records stamped "closed" in state
files; and F.B.I. usually expunges.
610.105 Applies to all counties. Nolle prosse, dismissal,
not guilty dispositions "closed". These "closed" records
open to no one except arrestee and police. No expungement
of these records from state files.
610.110 Can say never arrested if record expunged.
1973 St. A.G.O. said statute not retroactive - only 1973
arrests and forward are expunged.
1973 St. A.G.O. said expunge means destroyed.
1974 St. A.G.O. said expungement not available to reversed
convictions, even if found not guilty on remand.
1977 St. A.G.O. said pardon does not entitle arrestee to
expungement.
Montana 1 2* Statute allows for destruction of fingerprints and other
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. information upon a finding of innocence of felony charge.
§ 80-2003 (1965)
Nebraska NONE LOCATED
Nevada 1 2** 3 5 179.255 Provides for sealing of arrest records 30 days
Nev. Rev. Stat. after dismissal or acquittal, upon arrestee's petition to
§ 179.245 (1971) court.
§ 179.255 (1971) 179.245 Provides for sealing conviction records 15 years
§ 179.285 (1971) after date of felony conviction or release from prison, 10years for gross misdemeanor, 5 years for other misdemeanors.
§ 179.295 (1971) Must have no arrests during waiting period. Convicted
must petition court. Court records are also sealed along
with F.B.I. and state fingerprint cards and photos, thus
expunging the F.B.I. record.
179.285 Provides that those who are granted expungement
pursuant to either of the above statutes may treat the
arrest/conviction as never having occurred.
179.295 Says that records are sealed to all except
arrestee, or, if arrestee dismissed and arrested again on
a similar charge, prosecution can open sealed records if
arrestee will be brought to trial.
F.B.I. Fpts. & Photos Returned/Destroyed
F.B.I. Arrest Rec. Expunged
Arrestee Must Petition Court
No Prior Convictions
State Records Sealed - Not Expunged
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State & Statute 1 2 3 4 5 Description/Limitations
New Hampshire 593.4 Provides for destruction of fpts./photos to exonerated
N.H. Stat. Ann. arrestee, but state police say not applicable to criminal§ 593.4 (1915) records.
§ 651.5 (1971) 651.5 If person sentenced to probation or conditional
discharge, he may petition court to annul conviction. 2
year waiting period (with no convictions during) for those
receiving conditional disch. Can be used in sentencing
for another crime, but person can answer "never convicted
or arrested for a crime not annulled by a court" (employers,
licensors, etc., must couch question in those terms).
Misdemeanor to disclose a person's annulled conviction
record. This section providing annulment is not available
if sentenced to prison.
New Jersey 1 2 3 4 2A: 85-15 et seq. Provide for expungement (defined as
N.J. Stat. Ann. "sealing") of misdemeanor arrest records not resulting in
2A: 85-15 et seq. conviction. N.J. Supreme Court ruled statute also applied(1973) to felonies (State v. E.B.R., 139 N.J. Super. 166, 353
A.2d 118 (1976)). Arrestee must petition court and payS2A: 164-28 (1975) court costs. Expungement not a right but is discretionary.
Though statute says expunged record released to no one
for any reason, N.J. Supreme Court ruled records could
be released to a defendant in a false arrest or malicious
prosecution case (Ulinsky v. Avignone,148 N.J. Super.
250, 372 A.2d 620 (1977)). Grounds for denying
expungement: usefulness to police outweighs disabilities
of arrest to arrestee, dismissal due to plea bargain or
exclusionary rule. Effect of sealing is that arrestee can
treat arrest as never having occurred.
2A: 164-28 Expungement of conviction 10 years from
conviction date or release (whichever later) if no subsequent
convictions. Not available for certain offenses. Procedure
same as 2A: 85-15.
New Mexico 28-2-1 et seq. Entitled "Criminal Offender Employment
N.M. Stat. Ann. Act", statute prohibits dissemination of records of arrest§ 28-2-1 et seq. (1978) not followed by conviction to public/private employers
§ 29-10-1 et seq. (1978) (except law enforcement agency employers), licensors, etc.
§ 29-10-1 et seq. Makes it felony to disseminate
non-conviction data to anyone but law enforcement andjudiciary. Pardoned offenses included.
New York 1 2* 3 5 Statute provides for sealing records, fingerprint cards,
N.Y. Crim. Proc. photos from F.B.I., state/local police if defendant receives
106.50 et seq. (1976) any favorable disposition. Not available if prosecutor
proves not in best interests of justice to seal or if a
criminal charge is pending. Statute also applies to arrests
before this legislation. This statute not applicable to
marijuana offense (which has its own sealing statute
expunging arrests & convictions after 3 year waiting
period). Sealed record available to: prosecution in marijuana
cases, police on ex parte motion, state/local agencies
giving gun licenses. Court records (excluding published
opinions or decisions on appeal) are also sealed.
I. F.B.I. Fpts. & Photos Returned/Destroyed
2. F.B.I. Arrest Rec. Expunged
3. Arrestee Must Petition Court
4. No Prior Convictions
5. State Records Sealed - Not Expunged
19791 A Comparative Summary
State & Statute 1 2 3 4 5 Description/Limitations
North Carolina "Expunction" means annulment of conviction. Available
N.C. Gen. Stat. only for drug possession conviction. Sentence must be
§ 90-96 (1977) probation, have no prior convictions, and this relief
available only once.
North Dakota NONE LOCATED
Ohio 1 2* 109.60 Provides for automatic return by State Crim.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. I.D. Bureau of fingerprints upon acquittal or nolle prosse§ 2953.31 (1977) of felony. Statute silent on expungement and misdemeanors.
§ 109.60 (1977) 2953.31 et seq. Conviction sealed after waiting period
(3 years felony-I year misdemeanor) if no priors, no
pending crim. prosecutions, and court feels convict
rehabilitated. Record is sealed and employers can't inquire
about expunged conviction unless it has relationship to
that position. However, expunged conviction can be used
in sentencing for subsequent offenses and impeachment.
Oklahoma NONE LOCATED
Oregon 181.555 Inaccurate or incomplete arrest, charge, or
Ore. Rev. Stat. disposition information is purged or expunged. Statute
§ 137.555(3) (1975) silent on non-conviction records.
§ 137.225 (1977) 137.225 Certain convictions annulled and sealed 3 years
from conviction date upon motion by convicted. Must
have no convictions during waiting period. Person can
answer "never convicted."
Pennsylvania District Attorney to destroy fingerprints of persons
Pa. Stat. Ann. acquitted. In Commonwealth v. Magaziner, 50 Pa. D. &
§ 19-1405(c) (1935) C.2d 291 (1970), grand jury dismissed adultery charges
against defendant but court held no expungement of state,
local, or F.B.I. arrest records or fingerprints. The court
also ruled that § 1405 not applicable to nolle prosse or
dismissal. Commonwealth v. Homison, 385 A.2d 443
(1978), held expungement not available for pardoned
offenses. Commonwealth v. Malone, 366 A.2d 584, 587
(1976) held no destruction of state or F.B.I. fingerprints
or arrest records; only prints of D.A. to be destroyed.
Thus no expungement statute in Pa.
Rhode Island 1 2* 4 12-1-11 Authorizes fingerprints/photos taken only of
R.I. Gen. Laws those charged and convicted.
§ 12-1-11 (1974) 12-1-12 Mandatory and automatic destruction of
§ 12-1-12 (1975) fingerprints/photos of exonerated arrestee if no priors.
§ 12-1-13 (1976) 12-1-13 Expungement of misdemeanor convictions if: 5
years after sentenced served, no convictions in those 5
years, original charge was not a felony and pleaded down,
no prior felony convictions. F.B.I. records also expunged.
South Carolina i 2 Upon any favorable disposition to arrestee, all records
S.C. Code (fingerprints, arrest records, etc.) kept by any law
§ 17-1-40 (1976) enforcement agency destroyed.
F.B.I. Fpts. & Photos Returned/Destroyed
F.B.I. Arrest Rec. Expunged
Arrestee Must Petition Court
No Prior Convictions
State Records Sealed - Not Expunged
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State & Statute 1 2 3 4 5 Description/Limitations
South Dakota NONE LOCATED
Tennessee 1 2 3 40-4001 All public records where arrestee exonerated,
Tenn. Code Ann. removed and destroyed upon petition to court, without
§ 40-4001 (1973) cost to petitioner. However, arrestee in diversion program
§ 40-2109 (1976) who is dismissed later, pays costs.
'40-2109 Nolle prosse entitled to expungement upon
petition to court.
Texas 1 2 3 4 If arrestee not formally charged or charge dismissed,
Tex. Crim. Pro. Ann. upon petition to court arrestee has right to expungement
§ 55.01 et seq. (1977) of F.B.I., state/local records if no prior felony conviction
in past 5 years.
Utah 1 2 3 5 (1) Applies to convictions. Expungement of felony &
Utah Code Ann. class A misdemeanor conviction 5 yrs. after release (1
§ 77-35-17.5(1) (1975) year for other misdemeanors) if no convictions in waiting
period, no pending prosecution, and court feels petitioner§ 77-177.5(2) (1973) is rehabilitated. Can treat conviction as never having
occurred. These records sealed.
(2) Applies expungement to exonerated arrestees upon
petition to court if no arrests during 12 month waiting
period. Also applies to arrests before this statute enacted.
F.B.I. records expunged, but state/local criminal & court
records sealed; access only to arrestee.
Vermont NONE LOCATED
Virginia i 2** 3 5 Exonerated arrestee petitions court to expunge (seal)
Va. Code Ann. police & court records. This is discretionary and not a
§ 19.2-392.2 et seq. right. Access to sealed record by ex parte order without
(1977) notice to arrestee, for employment in law enforcement,
or to D.A. & police for pending criminal investigation.
But above can just look at the record; no copies made.
Statute makes it misdemeanor for employer, educational
institutional, state/local government employers/licensors
to ask about expunged arrest record.
Washington 1 2 4 "Deletion" of non-conviction data upon favorable disposition
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. to arrestee, 2 years after disposition, if no prior felony
§ 10.97.060 (1977) or gross misdemeanor convictions, no pending prosecution,
no arrests during 2 year waiting period. Person requests
police to delete data. This relief not available to arrestees
in diversion program.
West Virginia 1 2* 4 All persons acquitted, if no prior convictions, request
W. Va. Code Ann. State Bureau of Crim. Ident. for fingerprints/photos to
§ 15-2-24(h) (1977) be returned.
Wyoming Access to criminal records limited to law enforcement
Wyo. Stat. Ann. agencies only.
§ 9-2-568 (1973)
Wisconson NONE LOCATED
F.B.I. Fpts. & Photos Returned/Destroyed
F.B.I. Arrest Rec. Expunged
Arrestee Must Petition Court
No Prior Convictions
State Records Sealed - Not Expunged
